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RECENT DECISIONS

RECENT DECISIONS
BAILMENT-EFFECT OF SETTLEMENT BY BAILEE AS A BAR TO ACTION
BAILOR-Plaintiff, as assignee of conditional vendor, brought an action
against defendant for damage done to an automobile sold to one Zinner under
a conditional sales agreement. The automobile was damaged through the negligence of the defendant and one Fulbrush, who, acting independently and with
no knowledge of the plaintiff's claim, settled with Zinner for the full amount of
damage; defendant and Fulbrush paying Zinner $429.55. The plaintiff later
repossessed the automobile as Zinner failed to keep up his payments under the
conditional sales agreement. Plaintiff sold the automobile in its damaged condition and brought this action for the difference in the sum realized and the
balance due him at the time he repossessed the automobile. The trial court
awarded the plaintiff $409, but the appellate court vacated the finding and
entered judgment for the defendant. Held, affirmed. Where a conditional
vendee, as bailee, makes a settlement for full damages, a release given by him
will bar another action by the conditional vendor, as bailor. Associates Discount
Corporation v. Gillineau, (Mass. 1948) 78 N.E. (2d) 192.
_It is a general rule of law that a bailee may bring an action against a tortfeasor for full damages done to goods in his possession,1 the principle being that
po;;session is sufficient ground on which to maintain the action. 2 One court has
allowed such recovery on the ground that the bailee is the bailor's agent.8 The
bailee is deemed to hold money, in excess of his interest, in trust for the bailor 4
and the action of the bailee is a bar to a future action by the bailor.5 The
majority rule, in the analogous cases of mortgages and conditional sales, is that
a settlement or release, for the full amount by the one in possession, constitutes
a bar to a second action just as a court action is a bar. 6 However, in all cases, it
BY

1

The Winkfield, [ I 902] Prob. Div. 42; Kerr v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co., 129 Me. 48, 149 A. 618 (1930); Gardner v. Freystown Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 350
Pa. 1, 37 A. (2d) 535 (1944); Smyth v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.- of Maryland, 326
Pa. 391, 192 A. 640 (1937).
2
lndustrial Inv. Co. v. King, 159 Miss. 491, 132 S. 333 (1931).
8
Masterson v. International & G.N. Ry. Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1900) 55 S.W. 577.
4
Railway Express Agency v. Goodman's New York and Connecticut Express
Corp., 129 Conn. 386, 28 A. (2d) 869 (1942); Hopkins v. Colonial Stores, 224
N.C. 137, 29 S.E. (2d) 455 (1944).
5
First National Bank v. Union Ry. Co., 153 Tenn. 386 at 389-390, 284 S.W.
363 (1926): "It is well settled that either the conditional vendor or vendee can
prosecute an action for injury to the property by a third party•••• Also where the
relationship is that of bailor and bailee. A recovery by one is a bar to a recovery by
the other." See also Gardner v. Freystown Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 350 Pa. 1, 37 A. (2d)
535 (1944); The Vale Royal, (D.C. Md. 1943) 51 F. Supp. 412.
6
] . E. Harris v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Company, 190 N.C. 480, 130 S.E.
319 (1925); Mercer v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 211 N.C. 288, 189 S.E. 762
(1937); Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Earl, 121 Ark. 514, 181 S.W. 925 (1916);
Lowery v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 228 Ala. 137, 153 S. 467 (1934); 118 A.L.R.
1338 at 1344 (1939); contra: French v. Osmer, 67 Vt. 427 (1895). Most cases so
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must appear that the settlement and release were made in good faith and without
fraud or collusion, 7 for while a court action is public notice to all concerned, a settlement or release may be negotiated in secret. Thus, if the bailor
knows that a settlement has been made and accepts benefits under the settlement, it is proper to deny him an .action against the wrongdoer. 8 But if all
settlements which purport to cover full damages acted as a bar, a bailor might
be denied a recovery where the bailee settled for an inadequate sum due to his
contributory negligence in injuring the goods, or where the settlement was
not sufficient to protect the bailor's claim. 9 Consequently, where the bailee negotiated a settlement for a sum inadequate to compensate the bailor's loss, a release
given by the bailee was refused in evidence, in a later action by the bailor, on
the ground that it was incompetent and immaterial,1° and it has been held that
a bailor may recover damages to his property even though the bailee has settled
for his own personal injuries and ptrrported to give a release for all damages.11
If the bailee, however, has negotiated a fair settlement for the full amount of
damages, the courts have refused to allow an action by the bailor against the
third party wrongdoer even if the bailee has failed to repair the property.12 Such
a holding would seem to be based on the maxim that a tort-feasor should not
be vexed twice for the same wrong.18 If the bailee achieved a fair settlement for
the full amount of damages, it would appear just to follow this maxim and leave
the bailor to an action against his bailee; but where the bailee has settled for
less than the full amount of liability, the bailor should have an action as in the
holding are ones in which the wrongdoer has notice of the vendor's or mortgagee's
claim; see Commercial Securities Inc. v. Mast, 145 Ore. 394, 28 P. (2d) 635
(1934); Miller v. Hortman-Salmen Co., (La. 1933) 145 S. 786.
1
Motor Finance Co. v. Noyes, 139 Me. 159, 28 A. (2d) 235 (1942); First
National Bank v. Union Ry. Co., 153 Tenn. 386, 284 S.W. 363 (1926).
8
Mercantile Bank of the Americas, Inc. v. Flower Lighterage Co., (C.C.A. 2d,
1926) IO F. (2d) 705.
9
6 AM. JuR., Bailment, § 358 at p. 440, note 8: "Doubtless there are circumstances under which injustice would result from allowing the wrongdoer to plead the
bailee's release in bar, for example, where the consideration paid therefor is less than
the value of the bailor's reversionary interest, or is reduced in amount to a nominal
figure by reason of the bailee's contributory negligence. • • ."
10 National Bond & Investment Co. v. Gill, 123 Pa. Super. 341 at 346, 187 A.
75 (1936): "Of course, the bailee had a rJght to settle for his own damages, but to
hold that a settlement made by him would bar the right of his bailor to recover from
the tortfeasor the value of its ownership and interest in the car would be unreasonable
and unjust." See also 21 MINN. L. REv. 449 (1937); 50 HARV. L. REv. 829
(1937).
11
Belli v; Forsyth, 301 Mass. 203, 16 N.E. (2d) 656 (1938).
12 Juniata Acceptance Corporation v. Hoffman, 139 Pa. Super. 87, II A. (2d)
494 (1939). In distinguishing the earlier case of National Bond & Investment Co.
v. Gill, 123 Pa. Super. 341, 187 A. 75 (1936), the court said at p. 90, "There exists
also an important distinction between the Gill Case and the one at bar. In t]le former
the defendant paid but part of the damage; here the defendant paid the full amount
of damage to the bailee."
18
Hardman v. Brett, (C.C. N.Y. 1889) 37 F. 803; Industrial Inv. Co. v. King,
159 Miss. 491, 132 S. 333 (1931).
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case where the bailee has brought a court action for his interest only.14 Thus,
where a settlement or release is interposed as a bar to an action by a bailor, the
court should disallow the action only after it has determined that the settlement
covered the full amount and was fairly determined. The effect of settlement by
mere possessors who are not bailees or in positions analogous thereto is outside
the scope of this note.
•

C. E. Becraft, S.Ed.

14 Rindge v. Coleraine, l I Gray (Mass.) l 57 ( l 8 58) ; Fletcher v. Perry, l 04
Vt. 229, 158 A. 679 (1932) where, in the dictum, at p. 233, the court states: "But
a recovery by the bailee to the extent only of his possessory interest is not a bar to
an action by the bailor for damages to his reversionary interest." Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. Goodman's New York and Connecticut Express Corporation, 129
Conn. 386, 28 A. (2d) 869 (1942).

